CSR Business as Usual? The Case of the Tobacco Industry by Palazzo, Guido & Richter, Ulf
CSR Business as Usual? The Case
of the Tobacco Industry
Guido Palazzo
Ulf Richter
ABSTRACT. Tobacco companies have started to posi-
tion themselves as good corporate citizens. The effort to-
wards CSR engagement in the tobacco industry is not only
heavily criticized by anti-tobacco NGOs. Some opponents
such as the the World Health Organization have even
categorically questioned the possibility of social responsi-
bility in the tobacco industry. The paper will demonstrate
that the deep distrust towards tobacco companies is linked
to the lethal character of their products and the dubious
behavior of their representatives in recent decades. As a
result, tobacco companies are not in the CSR business in
the strict sense. Key aspects of mainstream CSR theory and
practice such as corporate philanthropy, stakeholder col-
laboration, CSR reporting and self-regulation, are dem-
onstrated to be ineffective or even counterproductive in
the tobacco industry. Building upon the terminology used
in the leadership literature, the paper proposes to differ-
entiate between transactional and transformational CSR
arguing that tobacco companies can only operate on a
transactional level. As a consequence, corporate responsi-
bility in the tobacco industry is based upon a much thinner
approach to CSR and has to be conceptualized with a focus
on transactional integrity across the tobacco supply chain.
KEY WORDS: CSR, corporate philanthropy, organi-
zational legitimacy, tobacco industry, the common good,
integrity, transactional CSR, transformational CSR
The tobacco industry has entered the CSR de-
bate. BAT (2003) has published its first CSR report
2002/2003 and has been awarded for it. Philip
Morris International has published substantial infor-
mation on its CSR-related position and activities on
its webpage. Imperial Tobacco has set up a webpage
dedicated to CSR providing information on youth
smoking, smuggling, stakeholder dialogue and human
rights issues. Japan Tobacco publishes at least infor-
mation on what they consider their corporate social
responsibility. Obviously, even tobacco companies
strive for the status of good corporate citizens. In its
recruiting activities, for instance, Philip Morris has
communicated its goal to become ‘‘the most success-
ful, respected and socially responsible global consumer
products company’’.
It has become an established phenomenon that
critical NGOs react to CSR communication by
highlighting the shortcomings. Companies that
report on their engagement are almost immediately
confronted with the critique of opposed NGOs. BPs
claim to be now the world largest producer of solar
energy, for instance, was countered with the alle-
gation that the only reason for this was that BP
bought the solar energy producer Solarex for a
neglectable $45 million in comparison to its $26.5
billion investment in the major US fuel retailer
ARCO (Bruno, 2000). CSR reports are answered
by ‘‘alternative’’ CSR reports or analyses (e.g. for
McDonald’s CSR report see Tapscott and Ticoll,
2003, p. 179). Anecdotic CSR reports are answered
by anecdotic counter-examples. Therefore, it was of
no surprise that the first CSR report in the tobacco
industry motivated comparable reactions from anti-
tobacco NGOs (cf. foremost Rimmer, 2004). This is
the normal procedure in the currently developing
dynamic of civil society and economic actors and it
can be regarded as a crucial driver for a continually
improved CSR performance. However, in the case
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of the tobacco industry, leading opponents such as
the World Health Organization (WHO) (2003) have
categorically questioned the possibility of social
responsibility in the tobacco industry, describing it as
an ‘‘inherent contradiction’’.
The tobacco industry is different from other
industries for two reasons. The first reason is linked
to the products it sells. Today, there is no doubt
that smoking is both addictive and lethal. Scientific
research has shown that one in two long-term
smokers will die prematurely as a result of smoking –
half of them middle-aged. Obviously, the interests of
the tobacco industry run counter to the social good
(Michalos, 1997). The second reason is linked to the
past behavior of the industry’s representatives. They
have lost credibility due to their strategy of denying
risks and manipulating information and as a result
they are confronted with massive distrust from their
relevant publics.
If tobacco companies cannot even comply with
the minimum CSR criterion of primum non nocere
(Drucker, 1973, p. 368), how can they ever
achieve the status of good citizenship and social
responsibility? We will address that question in our
paper by outlining CSR challenges facing the
tobacco industry. We will develop the argument
that the specific characteristics of the industry leave
no room for public acceptance and corporate
reputation as it is normally targeted by corpora-
tions in other industries. As a consequence, CSR
in the tobacco industry must be conceptualized
differently from the mainstream understanding of
the debate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In
the next two sections we give a rough sketch of the
two problematic dimensions of the tobacco industry,
the lethal character of its products and the past
behavior of its representatives. We then describe the
limits to CSR in the tobacco industry as emerging
from these two problems. In the following section
we outline the assumption that the recent discovery
of CSR in the tobacco industry contrasts with
numerous ethically problematic patterns of behavior
that still seem to link the industry to its ‘‘dark ages’’,
thus fueling the deep distrust towards tobacco
companies. However, there are even some signs of
authentic changes within the industry which we are
also going to sketch. In the concluding part, we
outline a CSR approach for the tobacco industry
which is built upon a much thinner approach than
conceptualized in the mainstream debate.
The killing fields of tobacco
The first scientific case-control study on health
effects of tobacco use was published by the German
epidemiologist Franz H. Mu¨ller (1939), establishing
a positive relationship between lung cancer and
cigarette smoking. But his study was widely ignored
due to historical circumstances (Doll, 2001). It was
not until 1950 that the scientific landscape changed
when the British Medical Journal published a land-
mark case-control study by Doll and Hill (1950).
Studying the smoking habits of doctors they found a
clear positive relationship between smoking and
lung cancer. This study was followed by four dec-
ades of reports demonstrating that smoking had been
by far the most important cause of lung cancer
amongst the studied populations. After a decade of
intensified research, the report by the U.S.-Surgeons
General in 1964 stated that ‘‘cigarette smoking
contributes substantially to mortality from certain
specific diseases and to the overall death rate’’ (U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
1964, p. 31). The report caused a nationwide debate
on television, radio and in the press on tobacco
smoking and inhalation and its effects (Lanfranco,
1970). Additionally, Domino (1973) concluded that
nicotine is an addictive substance, followed by
Russell (1974, p. 254) who emphasized ‘‘the crucial
role of nicotine in the generation and maintenance
of cigarette dependence, the ‘potency’ of which
ensures that almost anybody who smokes at all
becomes dependent’’.
Today, after 70,000 scientific articles having been
published it is an acknowledged fact that nicotine is a
physiologically active, addictive substance and that
tobacco consumption is a major threat to public
health (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 1988; WHO, 1999, 2002). Tobacco
smoking and tobacco smoke cause more than 40
often lethal diseases (Doll, 2000; International
Agency for Research on Cancer, 2002). Voluntary
as well as involuntary smoking, also called second-
hand or ‘‘environmental’’ tobacco smoke, is car-
cinogenic (International Agency for Research on
Cancer, 2002). Women are additionally endangered
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as maternal smoking is harmful during pregnancy
and has long-term effects on the baby after birth
(WHO, 2002). Today, the WHO (2002, p. 36)
states that ‘‘cigarettes kill half of all lifetime users’’
and estimates that deaths related to tobacco will rise
from about four million a year in 1998 to about 10
million a year in 2030 (WHO, 1999). While con-
sumption is decreasing in developed countries,
consumption in developing countries is increasing
by about 3.4% per annum (WHO, 1999) causing
expected mortality to rise significantly. Health
damages of tobacco have also a high economic
impact on national economies. For Germany, it is
estimated that tobacco consumption is responsible
for 1.4% of all labor costs, as a result of lower net
labor productivity and higher social security contri-
butions (Deutsches Krebsforschungszentrum, 2003).
In 1999, it accounted for 6% of all health care
expenditures in the U.S. (WHO, 2002). By com-
paring mortality, morbidity, and health costs to
benefits to consumers and producers, the WHO
(1999) estimates that tobacco causes a worldwide net
economic loss of 13.6 million dollars per year. This
figure clearly contradicts the most basic argument
advanced by the tobacco industry: the wealth crea-
tion its activity provides to society via employment
and taxes. Despite all the negative effects, the pro-
duction of cigarettes has increased. For example
between 1994 and 1997 it increased by 26%.
The dark ages of the tobacco industry
When the tobacco industry realized that the studies
proving the health damages of tobacco consumption
were becoming a threat to their very existence, they
started to foster research that cast doubt upon the
addictive character of nicotine and research that
associated lung cancer with anything but smoking.
In 1953, the presidents of the major tobacco com-
panies met with the public relations company Hill &
Knowlton in order to engage in a massive, long-
term public relations campaign ‘‘positive in nature
and (...) entirely ‘pro-cigarettes’ ’’ (Goss, 1953, p. 2).
For this purpose, the tobacco companies founded
institutes like the Tobacco Institute in Washington
(1958) to do research in favor of the tobacco
industry and lobby for their interests. They paid
‘independent’ scientists for their tobacco-friendly
research (Burch, 1978; McDonald, 1982; Sterling,
1975). An early example of the counter-argumen-
tation used was the claim of Fisher (1957) that there
was a genetic predisposition to smoke and to have
lung cancer. Therefore giving up cigarettes, would
not prevent cancer as risk was genetically deter-
mined. Furthermore, tobacco companies provided
grants to researchers that tried to prove that former
studies were grounded on unscientific methods or
poor statistical techniques. Criticisms included that
populations were not randomly selected, populations
were not representative, interviewers were not
experienced, and that participants were biased by
‘‘self selection’’ (TIA, 1985; BAT, 1994). In later
reports they claimed that warnings were not justified
due to insufficient evidence; they accused govern-
ments of being prohibitionists, and argued that for
democratic countries, coercion was intolerable
(BAT, 1994; Chapman and Carter, 2003). For
decades the industry engaged in massive lobbying
and misinformation campaigns publicly claiming to
question the scientific evidence. Their clear aim was
to protect themselves against liability claims brought
forward by affected customers and to avoid gov-
ernment regulation (Glantz et al., 1996). Moreover,
tobacco companies consistently denied the adverse
effects of tobacco, especially via passive smoking
(Yach and Bialous, 2001). Having identified the
WHO as the major enemy in their global fight to sell
their products, tobacco companies deliberately sub-
verted the tobacco control efforts of the WHO for
many years (Zeltner et al., 2000).
The industry clearly targeted teenagers as the
main target market, well knowing that by creating
early addiction, they would probably be faithful
consumers of their brand. As far back as the 1970s,
Philip Morris knew that its best selling Marlboro
brand was teenagers’ favorite choice (Cummings
et al., 2002, i7). Internal statements from the early
80s show the industry’s marketing focus: ‘‘Today’s
teenager is tomorrow’s potential customer, and the
overwhelming majority of smokers first begin to
smoke while still in their teens’’ (Johnston et al.,
1981, p. 1).
In 1966, U.S. tobacco companies were mandated
to introduce the first warning statement on cigarette
packs worldwide: ‘‘Caution – cigarette smoking may
be hazardous to your health’’ (Chapman and Carter,
2003) but already in 1970, the U.S. Department of
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Health Education and Welfare found that warnings
did not effect cigarette consumption. This motivated
the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (2000) to
eliminate tobacco broadcast advertising from January
1, 1971 on. In 1992 the European tobacco industry
adopted the health warnings proposed by the
European Economic Community (EEC) to avoid
further sanctions (Chapman and Carter, 2003).
However, as the British Medical Association (1999,
p. 6) notes, ‘‘in the absence of warnings imposed by
government, the tobacco industry fails to disclose
even the most basic information on the health risks
of smoking’’.
The strategy of manipulation and misinformation
culminated in the appearing of seven tobacco com-
pany CEOs in a U.S. Congressional hearing, testi-
fying that nicotine is not addictive. In the early
1990s tons of internal papers revealed that the
companies had been well aware for decades of the
lethal and addictive character of smoking. Conse-
quently, there is a deep and probably long lasting
public distrust towards the industry’s activities and
communication.
CSR and the search for organizational
legitimacy
In recent years corporations have been confronted
with ever rising expectations from their societal
environment (Matten and Crane, 2005). Especially
transnational corporations assume responsibilities
that once were regarded as a governmental domain:
public health, education, social security, human
rights protection, illiteracy, malnutrition, Aids,
homelessness, just to mention a few examples of the
expanding corporate non-business activities (Mar-
golis and Walsh, 2003; Matten and Crane, 2005).
With farsightedness, Peter Drucker already described
the changing role of business in society in the early
1970s. CSR ‘‘demands that business takes responsi-
bility for social problems, social issues, social and
political goals beyond their core business activities’’
(Drucker, 1973, p. 315). Corporate responsibility
goes beyond the compliance with the legal and basic
moral rules of society. As members of society, cor-
porations have to take into account the common
good and to improve societal welfare (Kok et al.,
2001). Corporations can demonstrate to their
stakeholders that they are ‘‘doing the right thing’’
through their CSR engagement (Joyner and Payne,
2002, p. 299). CSR normally aims at legitimizing a
corporation’s activities and increasing corporate
acceptance. The preservation of societal acceptance
is the main driving force of CSR activities (Weaver
et al., 1999). Accordingly, corporate legitimacy has
been described as the ‘‘yardstick’’ for the CSR dis-
cussion (Sethi, 1975; see also Carroll, 1979; Maignan
and Ferrell, 2000; Wartick and Cochran, 1985).
Suchman (1995, p. 574) defines legitimacy as ‘‘a
generalized perception or assumption that the actions
of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate
within some socially constructed system of norms,
values, beliefs, and definitions’’. The following
section will discuss selected aspects of CSR against
the background of its legitimacy aspect since we
expect it to be the main vulnerability of tobacco
CSR. It is the societal acceptance dimension of
CSR that constitutes the differences between the
mainstream approach and the particular situation in
the tobacco industry. We assume that due to the
lethal character of smoking and the past behavior of
tobacco companies, some key issues of CSR simply
do not work the normal fashion. In the following,
we will shortly discuss the limits of four issues that
are normally regarded as important for achieving
societal legitimacy through CSR engagement: cor-
porate philanthropy, stakeholder collaboration, CSR
reporting, and self-regulation activities. The discussion
will demonstrate that these central aspects of the
mainstream approach to CSR are ineffective or even
counterproductive in the tobacco industry.
The limits to CSR in the tobacco industry
(1) Corporate philanthropy is a core aspect of CSR.
Doing good and giving back to society sometimes is
even conflated with CSR or citizenship behavior
itself (discussed by Matten and Crane, 2005; as a
recent example: Porter and Kramer, 2002). For
tobacco companies, a philanthropic approach to
CSR runs into several constraints. A first constraint
might be called the ‘‘dirty money’’ problem. The
decision to contribute to charities is constrained by
the public pressure on those who take money from
tobacco companies. When BAT gave money to the
University of Nottingham for the foundation of a
390 Guido Palazzo and Ulf Richter
CSR research center, they provoked a furious debate
within and around the University (Maguire, 2000).
Similarly, it caused a public outcry when it became
known that BAT offered to sponsor students at the
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
(Meikle, 2002). In Hungary, BAT became the
center of attention of health advocates when it
announced its substantial strengthening of the
sponsorship of the University of Pe´cs that made it
the principal sponsor of the second largest university
of the country (Simpson, 2005). Western Michigan
University was heavily criticized by Campaign for
Tobacco-Free Kids for its decision to honor Philip
Morris USA Inc. as its employer of the year
(Prichard, 2004). Ethical Corporation magazine
dropped Philip Morris as a possible sponsor for a
corporate ethics conference in Hong Kong in
October 2004 because two participants retreated in
protest (Sydney Morning Herald, 2004). For
tobacco companies, the number of potential bene-
ficiaries of corporate philanthropy is considerably
limited.
A second constraint in the philanthropy context
might be called the ‘‘strategy dilemma’’. In the
current, debate it has been argued that corporations
should choose a strategic approach to philanthropic
engagement. A strategic approach is characterized
by two aspects: The philanthropic engagement
should be based upon core competencies and it
should be used for improving corporate reputation
(Porter and Kramer, 2002). Core competencies are
for instance behind the CSR engagement of
Deutsche Bank, Microsoft or Merck & Co. The
Deutsche Bank has started to engage in the micro
credit business building upon their banking com-
petency. Microsoft is focusing its CSR engagement
on IT education and lifelong learning. Merck & Co
have built upon their research expertise and
developed a drug against river blindness, distribut-
ing the drug free of charge and treating around 25
million people each year in developing countries.
For tobacco companies a strategic approach to
corporate giving is difficult to implement since the
specific characteristics of its products do not allow
for a focus on core competencies. The reputational
aspect is quite problematic as well, since there
might be even more pressure on the charity orga-
nization if the tobacco company decides to launch
a cause-related marketing campaign around their
engagement. Accordingly, a tobacco corporations’
ability to improve their ‘‘competitive context’’
through acts of philanthropy (Porter and Kramer,
2002, p. 58) is considerably limited. A philan-
thropic doing-good strategy can neither build upon
the business core competencies nor be used for
marketing without provoking strong reactions of
indignation. Indeed, even if they engage in causes
that are distant from their own business (e.g. Philip
Morris donating money to the fight against
domestic violence), tobacco companies might also
provoke public resistance since the whole engage-
ment might be suspected to be an act of window
dressing, with the intention to blur intrinsic ethical
problems of the industry and its products.
(2) Stakeholder collaboration has been identified as a
main pillar of a credible CSR engagement. Corpo-
rate societal engagement should be based upon close
collaboration within the stakeholder network (e.g.
Calton and Payne, 2003; Swanson, 1999; Wicks and
Freeman, 1998). Collaboration not only leads to
greater credibility of CSR activities, it furthermore
promises positive effects on reputation. Collabora-
tion with highly reputed organizations entails repu-
tation spill-overs (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). In
the tobacco industry, the contrary can be expected.
Collaboration with external partners is limited by the
reputational risks for those who cooperate with
tobacco companies. This is especially true in the field
of scientific research which is of paramount impor-
tance for tobacco companies. Scientific research that
is sponsored by tobacco companies is exposed to
conflicts of interest and will unavoidably taste of
manipulation (Kaufman et al. 2004). This can be
seen in the fact that some scientific journals do not
even publish research that is funded by the tobacco
industry (Ong and Glantz, 2001). Being paid by the
tobacco industry or cooperating with it threatens the
reputation of the external partner, especially for
cooperating scientific researchers or critical NGOs.
There are two recent examples that demonstrate
this. The collaboration between Philip Morris and
Ragnar Rylander, an environmental medicine
professor in Gothenburg whose research dealt with
the health effects of passive smoking and who has
been accused of scientific fraud (Tallmo, 2002). The
donations of several tobacco companies to the
environmental grassroots movement KAB (Keep
America Beautiful) equally illustrate this phenome-
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non (Lamb, 2001). Collaboration is additionally
limited because some of the most important stake-
holders refuse to interact with representatives of the
tobacco industry. It is precisely those potential
partners with outstanding credibility such as the
WHO that do not cooperate. On the contrary, they
try to maintain arm’s-length relationships with the
industry (Ong and Glantz, 2001). For some actors in
the tobacco stakeholder network, Freeman’s (1997)
‘‘principle of limited immortality’’ is not acceptable.
Being on a crusade against smoking, the continued
existence of the corporations is not in the interest of
leading NGOs. It is beyond the scope of this article
to discuss the behavior of anti-tobacco activism even
if their behavior might also provoke some critical
questions. Some NGOs such as Ash or Tobaccof-
reekids refuse to talk to tobacco companies, some
institutions, such as the WHO are at least very
reluctant to talk to them in public. Anti-Tobacco
NGOs often have no vision beyond the destruction
of their counterparts. However, smoking is legal and
a lot of people around the world smoke. Prohibition
has not proved effective, on the contrary, it has
clearly brought to the surface and exposed the
unintended consequences of criminalizing drugs.
Even extremely critical NGOs can not wish that
controllable companies such as BAT or Philip
Morris give their business to uncontrollable Mafia
organizations that certainly would replace them.
Irrespective of this, it seems that for tobacco com-
panies, CSR must be pursued in coerced isolation
from a large part of its relevant publics.
(3) In their CSR reporting, corporations normally
focus on the positive effects of their engagement,
sometimes with smaller aspects of self-critique (in
the form of ‘‘what remains to be done’’). If the social
reporting of a tobacco company follows that main-
stream approach to CSR reporting, it will not
increase its credibility but rather be regarded as the
perfect example of window-dressing. The first CSR
report in the tobacco industry was published by
BAT. It has been criticized for concealing the central
aspect of its business, the annual death of millions of
people (Burton and Rowell, 2002). As long as cor-
porate transparency is limited in such a way, the
industry must live with the general suspicion as
formulated by Tapscott and Ticoll (2003, p. 283):
‘‘Nobody in the business of cigarette manufacturing
can be a truly open enterprise, because the product
causes harm’’. Another particularity: While profes-
sional CSR reporting often helps companies to be-
come attractive for socially responsible investment
funds, in the case of tobacco companies this rarely
happens. ‘‘The common denominator among the
vast majority of ethical or social responsible invest-
ment policies and products is the exclusion of to-
bacco companies in their portfolios’’ (Yach,
Brinchmann and Bellet, 2001, p. 191). The Zurich-
based Sustainable Asset Management Fund (SAM)
has come under attack for its decision to include
BAT in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (Burton
and Rowell, 2002). It seems as if CSR reporting in
the tobacco industry is much more delicate than in
other industries. Tobacco companies can not simply
adopt the standards and procedures of mainstream
reporting. They have to develop a different and
more radical form of transparency.
(4) Self-regulation has become a major activity of
transnationally operating companies that come under
public pressure. Self-regulation is already criticized
in other industries but it is even less acceptable for
relevant stakeholders in the cigarette market
(Hammond and Rowell, 2001). Voluntary initiatives
that normally result in specific codes of conduct and
are monitored by the participating corporations
themselves are often criticized to be mere acts of
window-dressing. Without real transparency and
third party control, it is often business as usual that
takes place behind the veil of well-formulated ethical
rules (Rondinelli, 2002). In their analysis of the
Responsible Care Program in the chemical industry,
King and Lenox describe how self-regulation with-
out sanctions leads to opportunism. On the average,
members showed no different behavior than non-
members (King and Lenox, 2000). Corporate
self-regulation often lacks transparency, account-
ability, and thus is deprived of any legitimacy. It is
not astonishing that the WHO questions the moti-
vation of the tobacco industry behind their decision
to ban tobacco marketing aimed at children. ‘‘We
have seen no evidence that tobacco companies are
capable of self-regulation and we need to be alert to
any new attempt to persuade us that this new effort
will succeed’’ as the WHO general-director Gro
Harlem Brundlandt argued (Rondinelli, 2002, p.
407). When BAT, Philip Morris and Japan Tobacco
adopted an international voluntary code of market-
ing, financial analysts did not expect any influence
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on sales volumes. ‘‘According to a leaked memo
from a tobacco analyst for Credit Suisse Group the
voluntary initiative was simply a way ‘to improve the
tobacco industry’s image’’’ (Burton and Rowell,
2002).
Deeply rooted distrust that has grown over dec-
ades seems to be the leitmotiv of the described
deviations from standard reactions to corporate social
engagement. Therefore, one of the key ambitions
of the tobacco industry is to distance itself from
its own former behavior demanding that the pub-
lic should judge it by its current actions and not
by its past activities. They portray themselves as a
reformed industry and CSR engagement as well as
CSR rhetoric are key elements of this strategy.
However, a lot of relevant audiences still do not trust
tobacco corporations because they do not believe
in a genuine rupture with the past. The discovery
of CSR in the tobacco industry is suspected to
blur the ‘‘real’’ intentions of the corporations, their
hidden agenda of business as usual. And indeed, some
patterns of behavior of tobacco companies give reason
to distrust the authenticity of their CSR engagement.
In the following analysis we mostly refer to two
players in the tobacco market, BAT and Philip
Morris. This is due to the fact that they are the
dominating corporate brands. Both are prominent
figures in CSR rhetoric and engagement. Due to
their market positions, their behavior shapes the
public’s perception of the whole industry. The
behavior of the less-known brands in the shadow of
those market leaders can often be expected to be
worse but less documented by industry-critics. We
will sometimes refer to ‘‘the’’ industry, being aware
of the fact that such a generalization is justified only
in some cases of industry-wide consistent patterns of
activities and argumentation. Different players in the
market show different levels of critical behavior.
However, the generalization of our analysis might be
justified by the fact that in their relevant network of
anti-tobacco NGOs, all tobacco corporations are
indeed perceived as a compact and homogenous
group. They all act in each other’s shadow. ‘‘Should
anybody trust the tobacco industry?’’ (Hammond
and Rowell, 2001, p. 3) will be the key question for
the credibility and effectiveness of tobacco CSR in
each single company. In the following, we discuss
eight examples of current behavior in the industry
that – at least for some major critics in civil society –
seem to be proof of the unreformed continuation of
past behavior.
Unholy spirits from the past
The intact PR machinery
Two (probably linked) observations raise the sus-
picion that the PR machinery of the old times is
still intact. First observation: In 1999, Philip Morris
USA spent $75 million on charity and $100 million
for a marketing campaign on its charity engagement
(Porter and Kramer, 2002). Second observation: To
market their new image, they cooperate with PR
companies such as Burson–Marsteller who were
already a reliable partner in the dark ages of to-
bacco business. They were involved in the secret
Whitecoat project that aimed at reduced regulation
and increased social acceptability for smoking.
When developing the European expansion of the
Whitecoat project in 1994, Burson-Marsteller saw
the need to ‘‘educate’’ the public and political
decision-makers who in their view, were ‘‘vulnerable
to activists’ emotional appeals and press campaigns’’
(Rampton and Stauber, 2000). Regarding PR as a key
CSR instrument is a dangerous misunderstanding,
especially for corporations that already operate on a
low level of public trust (Asforth and Gibbs, 1990).
The sound science strategy
In the same Whitecoat project in 1994, Burson–
Marsteller formulated the assumption that the
mainstream scientific position is to follow the pre-
cautionary principle. This position demands that
‘‘even if a hypothesis is not 100 percent scientifically
proven, action should be taken, e.g. global warm-
ing’’ (Rampton and Stauber, 2000). With the help of
their PR partners, tobacco companies tried to
establish a ‘‘sound science’’ debate based on ‘‘good
epidemiology’’ that casts doubt upon broadly
accepted scientific research on the link between
smoking and cancer dismissing it as ‘‘junk science’’
(Ong and Glantz, 2001). The aim was to trivialize
the risk of tobacco use and to influence public health
policy (Yach and Bialous, 2001). Tobacco compa-
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nies have been criticized for applying the same
strategy today to the problem of passive smoking
(Hammond and Rowell, 2001, p. 47; Samet and
Burke, 2001, p. 1742). The courtesy and tolerance
campaign of BAT and their one-dimensional infor-
mation policy concerning the risk of passive smoking
as demonstrated in their CSR communication seems
to play a well-known melody. In its 2002/2003
Social Report, BAT states that passive smoking ‘‘can
be a source of annoyance to non-smokers and
smokers alike and is considered by some public
health authorities to be a health concern. We believe
that the health effects have been overstated’’. In a
hearing at the UK House of Commons, BAT stated
that ‘‘it has become common usage to describe many
pleasurable activities, which some people find hard
to give up or prefer not to give up, as ‘addictions’.
People say they are addicted to particular foods,
using the internet, taking exercise, watching certain
television programs, or even to working’’ (United
Kingdom Parliament, 2000). This is the same double
speaking junk science strategy that formerly was
applied to the health effects of smoking.
Hidden marketing activities
Anti-tobacco activists argue that the more the
explicit marketing activities for tobacco are reduced,
the more hidden measures are taken to influence
smokers. One striking example is the use of tobacco
in Hollywood movies. Contrary to the 1998 Master
Settlement Agreement between 46 U.S.-American
states and the tobacco industry, the use of tobacco
‘‘in the most popular youth-oriented movies has
actually increased by 50 percent’’ (Ng and Dakake,
2002). Though not necessarily being the result
of conspirative activities by tobacco corporations
themselves, such revelations discredit not only
the authenticity of tobacco CSR; They also sub-
vert the corporations’ official position to underage
smoking.
Involvement in criminal acts
Tobacco companies have long been suspected for
being involved in criminal activities such as the
contraband sale of cigarettes. Internal documents
demonstrate that even before the early 1990s some
companies were involved in smuggling and most of
them knew about cigarette smuggling without taking
measures against it (ASH, 2000; Tobaccofreekids,
2004a). On January 14, 2003 the German customs
officials searched the headquarters of the German
Imperial Tobacco subsidiary Reemtsma suspecting
the evasion of taxes and involvement in smuggling
from the former Soviet Union to the EU and par-
ticularly Germany. Managers were accused of having
actively encouraged criminal activities to undermine
German tax policies (BBC, 2003). Accusations were
supported by the statement of an arrested cigarette
smuggler who said that in 1995 alone, e 0.6 million
of cigarettes of Reemtsma’s (luxury) brand Davidoff
were exported to Mongolia even though it was well
known that nobody would smoke them there.
Similarly, the Russian army was supplied with far
more cigarettes than their possible demand could
have been at this time (Die Welt, 2003).
Political lobbying
Good corporate citizenship has to do with trans-
parency and accountability. The backdoor bargain-
ing conspiracy represents the attempt to influence
political decision-making without the public being
involved and informed. In the past, tobacco com-
panies have invested a lot of money and energy in
lobbying against regulations. In Australia for in-
stance, tobacco companies delayed the implemen-
tation of health warnings concerning addiction
(Chapman and Carter, 2003). Similarly they have
been lobbying against tax increases and advertise-
ment bans in developing countries (Whist, 1986).
Today, tobacco companies are accused of the
continuing of their anti-regulation lobbying. As
shown by the NGO Tobacco-free Kids ‘‘since 1999,
the tobacco companies have spent more than $101
million on lobbying the U.S. Congress’’ (Tobac-
cofreekids, 2004b). Lee and Glantz (2001) describe
the industry’s efforts to control tobacco policy
making in Switzerland. A progressive understanding
of CSR is incompatible with any kind of hidden
political lobbying. Companies that are experts in
backdoor bargaining are hardly accepted as partners
in dialogue. Distrustful anti-tobacco activists regard
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the current controversy around smoking not as ‘‘the
result of honest people who simply have different
views, but a carefully and expensively orchestrated
campaign by tobacco companies determined to
put profit before life’’ (Hammond and Rowell,
2001, p. 3).
Position on tax increases
A recurrent argument used by the tobacco industry
is that tax increases do not reduce smoking but
instead encourage smuggling and increase the
consumption of roll-your-own cigarettes, cheaper
brands or counterfeit cigarettes (BATM, 2003).
There are some good arguments that support this
thesis. Evidence from the Canadian market indi-
cates that the market for cigarettes is predominantly
price driven and the main drivers are the various
federal and/or provincial taxes (CISC, 2002).
When Canada substantially increased excise taxes
on cigarettes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
black market exploded. By 1994, it was estimated
that nearly 40% of Canada’s cigarette market was
being supplied through smuggling, causing an an-
nual loss of nearly $2 billion in tax revenues (U.S.
House of Representatives Committee on Com-
merce, 1998). The Canadian Government then
decided to sharply reduce taxes and was able to
successfully cut down the market for contraband
cigarettes again. However, the same Canadian study
and numerous other scientific studies show another
effect of tax increase which is largely ignored in the
industry’s statements: the reduction of smoking.
Tax increases can reduce smoking, especially
among low-income teenagers (Biener et al., 1998;
Tauras et al., 2001; Scollo et al., 2003) and among
pregnant women (Ringel and Evans, 2001). For
those who already distrust in the authenticity of the
social responsibility rhetoric, the strategic interest
behind the industry’s one-sided argumentation
against tax increase is only too obvious. In an
internal 1987 memo Philip Morris managers already
described what they officially denied: ‘‘The prob-
lem with tax increase is that it does decrease con-
sumption, just as ... the social engineers posing
these increases want to see’’ (quoted in Hammond
and Rowell, 2001) The same suspicion for a hid-
den agenda can be provoked by some tobacco
companies’ arguments against the international
convention on tobacco control, namely the argu-
ment that it would undermine the autonomy of
national governments (Burton and Rowell, 2002).
Powerless anti-smoking initiatives
By the 1990s, tobacco companies were already en-
gaged in youth smoking prevention programs. Philip
Morris International BAT, and Japan Tobacco
International financed more than 120 Youth
Smoking Prevention programs in more than 70
countries as stated on the BAT website. The results
are debatable. In a comparison between the Amer-
ican Legacy Foundation’s ‘‘Truth’’ campaign and
Philip Morris’ ‘‘Think. Don’t Smoke’’ campaign,
Farrelly et al. show that the independent truth-
campaign positively influences youths’ attitude
against smoking while the think-campaign has a
rather counterproductive influence. The think-
campaign improves the image of tobacco industry
(Farelly et al., 2002). In another study, Landman
et al. (2002, p. 925) criticize that industry-sponsored
anti-smoking initiatives ‘‘do not implement the
strategies that have been demonstrated to influence
youth smoking: aggressive media campaigns that
denormalize tobacco use and stress the industry’s
dishonesty’’. They position smoking as an adult activity
thus increasing the desire to smoke. The anti-smoking
initiatives of the industry might provoke the impression
of a hidden agenda.
Consumer vulnerability in the new markets
Eastern Europe and Asia are the growth markets for
the tobacco industry. In these regions, tobacco com-
panies are confronted with serious ethical challenges.
Consumers in developing countries are far more
vulnerable to marketing practices than experienced
consumers in western countries. They have less access
to information about the dangers of smoking and in
many cases are even illiterate. They might equate the
desired modern lifestyle and western values with
smoking (Amine, 1996). Furthermore, women might
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regard smoking as a symbol of emancipation. In
industrialized countries, the growth rate of smoking
among women at the beginning of the 20th century
was clearly related to their public role and status
(Schudson, 1984). The same is about to happen in the
under-developed world (WHO, 1992). The tobacco
companies operating in Africa, Asia or Eastern Europe
try to take advantage of these specific market con-
ditions and often refuse any special treatment for
specific target groups thus trying to seduce as many
smokers as possible. In Nigeria, BAT is for instance
currently realizing an expensive, nationwide pro-
motion campaign called ‘‘Collect II’’ for its famous
brand Rothmans, officially targeting young men
between 25 and 35 (Okonkwo, 2004). Consumer
vulnerability in the new markets will be a key ethi-
cal issue in the industry and the authenticity of its
CSR rhetoric will depend on how the corporations
will deal with it.
Of course, there are some rays of hope on the
horizon. In 2003, Philip Morris sued five importers
along with nearly 1500 retailers accusing them of
having delivered and sold more than 215,000 cartons
of cigarettes including counterfeit Marlboros and
other Philip Morris-brands (Gentile, 2003). In an
effort to fight contrabanding and counterfeiting,
Philip Morris International agreed on July 9, 2004 to
make payments to the EU over a 12 year period
totaling $1.25 billion that may ‘‘serve as a source of
additional funding for anti-contraband and anti-
counterfeit initiatives’’ (EU, 2004). The company
has announced its intention to develop and imple-
ment a tracking and tracing system that makes its
sales transparent in order to fight contraband ciga-
rettes (EU, 2004). This promises to be an important
step towards radical transparency in the tobacco
industry. Similarly, BAT, Gallaher Ltd, and Imperial
Tobacco signed agreements with the British HM
Customs and Excise that are designed to reinforce
cooperation in fighting tobacco smuggling into the
UK (HM Customs and Excise, 2003). Another
credible change may result from Philip Morris
International’s marketing code with its high stan-
dards of self-imposed limits to cigarette marketing.
However, against the already discussed public dis-
trust towards tobacco self-regulation, the code’s
credibility will depend on the clearly visible efforts
to implement it and to act against code violations by
company managers.
Conclusion: CSR in the tobacco industry
While CSR activities normally aim at gaining public
respect, reputation or even admiration, tobacco
companies have to accept that they are fighting on a
different legitimacy battlefield. They are fighting for
the mere right to exist. Tobacco industry finds itself
on the lowest level of public acceptance and the
lower the perceived legitimacy of a corporation the
more skeptically its legitimation attempts will be
observed by its relevant publics (Asforth and Gibbs,
1990). Our analysis demonstrates that mainstream
CSR efforts will hardly contribute to legitimize to-
bacco companies. Obviously, societal acceptance
has to do with some basic trustworthiness of the
corporation. Starting from a very low level of
trustworthiness, tobacco companies see their CSR
efforts exposed to a much greater scrutiny and a
much higher level of negative expectations than
companies in other industries. As demonstrated,
these negative expectations work against mainstream
CSR aspects and they are partly confirmed by the
seeming continuation of former patterns of behavior.
Can tobacco companies be good corporate citi-
zens? Perhaps they can, but not by imitating main-
stream ideas on CSR. Based on the terminology
used in the leadership literature (Antonakis and
House, 2002) and organizational trust discussion
(Mayer et al., 1995) we propose distinguishing be-
tween three levels of CSR performance:
1. The instrumental level refers to a corporation’s
ability. The corporations dispose of the skills
and competences that are necessary to deliver
products or services in the quality expected
by its customers.
2. The transactional level refers to a corporation’s
integrity. The corporation complies with the
legal and moral rules of their societal context. Its
transactions are transparent, its behavior is fair. It
keeps its promises and acts with consistency.
3. The transformational level refers to a corporation’s
benevolence. The corporation demonstrates that it
is willing to transcend self-interest for the sake
of the common good. It contributes to the
well-being of society.
Corporations that engage in CSR try to demonstrate
that they operate on all three level of CSR perfor-
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mance with Carroll’s fourth dimension of voluntary
philanthropic cause engagement being the visible
manifestation of self-interest transcendence (Carroll,
1991). CSR efforts of tobacco companies show the
same motivation. However, the effort to expose
themselves as benevolent actors rather nurtures their
credibility problems instead of improving their
legitimacy. As argued in the introduction, the
interests of the tobacco industry run counter to the
social good simply because tobacco kills. A CSR
strategy at the level of benevolence is doomed to
failure. For the time being, tobacco corporations for
a large part of their relevant publics are not even
credible on the second CSR level. Tobacco com-
panies should abstain from any attempt to link their
business to the common good. They should rather
pursue an integrity-based CSR approach on the
transactional level of their operations. Such a strategy
at the level of integrity has to be built upon painful
transparency and a clear and uncompromising rup-
ture with the old business practices that spoil the
perception of their authenticity. Of course, this leads
to a much thinner concept of CSR as established in
the theory discussion and corporate practice of other
industries. In highly controversial industries such as
tobacco harming the common good is probably
more significant than the benefit to some consumers
of the industry’s products. As a consequence, cor-
porations that operate in those industries need a
different approach to CSR. Our concept of three
levels of corporate societal performance may help to
clarify the difference between a transactional and a
transformational type of CSR. As the case of the
tobacco industry demonstrated, there may be a glass
ceiling between both levels that prevents companies
from some industries from being perceived as con-
tributing to the well-being of society. However, the
conclusion would be wrong to deem those corpo-
rations as excluded from CSR practice in general. As
we wish to demonstrate, those corporations have
only to accept that their activities are limited to the
transactional level.
If the integrity of business transactions is the focus
of CSR, this has considerable consequences for
corporate behavior. The main consequence: CSR in
the tobacco industry must be transaction-driven. Our
paper pleads for a transparent, dilemma-oriented
approach to CSR along the tobacco supply chain.
The critical public will at least expect a tobacco
corporation to clearly describe its dilemmas and not
to fall back into the old double speak (e.g. by
reducing a dilemma to a morally mainstreamed but
nevertheless hardly credible statement such as ‘‘our
marketing activities only aim at adults who already
are smokers of competing brands’’). An honest
description of all corporate dilemmas, from child
labor in tobacco production to marketing activities in
developing countries is the basic requirement in an
industry with no credibility. The tobacco industry
must thereby allow its critics to look deeply into its
operations. The tobacco industry must abstain from
any activities that might provoke even more distrust.
Anti-tobacco advertising is for instance not the job of
tobacco companies unless they adopt the effective
strategies of their harshest critics. They may support it
by money but should not decide upon the design.
Tobacco companies will be measured by their efforts
to install integrity across their supply chain. The
credibility of tobacco CSR might for instance be
propelled by the efforts to influence the behavior of
(independent) cigarette retailers who play a key role
in the control of underage access to cigarettes. The
tobacco industry should stop all political lobbying
activities and avoid cloudy scientific statements.
They could even completely withdraw from issuing
scientific statements at all and rather publish those of
the WHO or other reliable sources on their websites
and in their CSR reports. Tobacco companies should
stop using philanthropic engagement for building
reputation. Philip Morris may for instance continue
the engagement against domestic violence, they may
even continue to use this engagement for internal
motivation and identification, but they should not
publicly talk about it.
In some cases, integrity would even demand
proactive behavior: Tobacco companies should
make dilemmas transparent that are not yet in the
public awareness. They should have a closer col-
laboration with governments to create effective to-
bacco regulation. They should do this in transparent
discourses clearly accessible to civil society. They
should engage (and some of them already do) in
promoting transnational regulations and in the ab-
sence of those regulations, they should adopt the
highest standards of tobacco regulation around the
world on a voluntary and clearly accountable basis. A
good corporate citizen in the tobacco industry has to
develop and communicate a clear vision that leads
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beyond the established business practices. Corporate
transformation, from a marketing to a research-dri-
ven company (safe cigarettes as main target), might
be an element of such a vision.
In cases where moral dilemmas turn out to be
unsolvable, good corporate citizenship can entail
hazardous decisions. This might for instance be the
case for the industry’s marketing dilemma: Brand
loyalty is established at a young age, but tobacco
companies are not allowed to target teenagers. How
can they avoid attracting teenagers or even children
yet at the same time attract new customers with
comparable loyalty effects? How can they avoid
seducing non-smokers to start smoking? Unfortu-
nately, the industry needs new clients since their old
clients die early. It is an often used argument that
marketing activities exclusively aim at attracting
consumers of competing brands. However, this is a
hardly credible statement. Advertising or sponsoring
that portrays smoking as being fashionable unavoid-
ably seduces non-smokers to start smoking. Market-
ing campaigns that aim at a target group of 25 to
35 year-old smokers are potentially attractive for
non-smokers of the same age and definitely attract
much younger non-smokers to follow their elder
role models. It simply cannot be avoided. A good
corporate citizen might consider to substantially
reduce marketing activities in general even if the
competitors do not follow.
Our paper aims at demonstrating that tobacco
companies are not in the CSR business as it is
becoming common place now across various
industries and throughout academic research. As
long as cigarettes kill active and passive users, all that
a tobacco company can achieve is a reputation for
transactional integrity. When tobacco companies try
to link their activities to the common good, they
indeed provoke the legitimate question whether
tobacco and CSR are inherently contradictory. And
as the short description of an integrity-driven CSR
approach shows, even a much thinner idea of cor-
porate responsibility will already lead to considerable
changes for tobacco companies.
The discussion on CSR in the tobacco industry
reveals the limits of the concept in extremely
exposed industries. It might provide a valuable
learning experience for those industries that risk
being under comparable pressure at the future
business ethics front-line: the food industry which
will be linked to obesity or diabetes and the tele-
communication industry that is threatened by the
potential link between cancer and the use of
mobile phones.
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